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Since the end of the 2006 post-war transition, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and the international community have struggled to design,
finance and implement a host of national and regional disarmament, demo-
bilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. The weak capacity of imple-
menting institutions, widespread corruption, funding gaps, Western-driven
processes and a misdiagnosis of local needs have all been raised as core rea-
sons behind failures. Little is known about how processes of ex-combatant
return shape and reshape public authority, where former combatants return
to, how they negotiate and experience ‘return’ and how viable ways of life are
successfully constituted post return. While many ex-combatants in the DRC
continue to be re-recruited into militia groups, one group that has reintegrated
successfully is the Toleka—a several-thousand-strong group of ex-combatants
who returned (or remained) in the provincial capital of Mbandaka (Equateur
province). The Toleka formed a bicycle-taxi organization and unionized its
membership, providing protections and collective-bargaining authority to the
group, while providing a public good. It also helped to reshape identities,
produce a sense of civilian solidarity and provide a bridging function from
life in the military. This article looks at how this organization was formed,
how the former fighters identified and capitalized on a local need and the
conditions that allowed them to successfully unionize and protect their rights
as they re-entered civilian life. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews,
this article seeks to understand a case of ‘successful’ return in a region with
few such successes.
Keywords: DDR, return, demobilization, reintegration, DRC, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, taxi union, ex-combatant
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Ces ex-combattants, ce sont des e´ternels insatisfaits (‘‘These ex-combat-
ants, they are the eternally unsatisfied’’, authors’ interview with the
president of Les Aiglons, an implementing non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) of DDR programmes in the DRC, Gemena, February
2015).
Introduction
Every day in towns outside of the megacity of Kinshasa, thousands of young
men on colourful bicycles can be seen riding around town, transporting pas-
sengers, livestock and burlap sacks of foodstuffs (sometimes all three at the
same time) strapped on the back of their bicycles. Life in the run-down city
of Mbandaka, the provincial capital of Congo’s north-western province of
Equateur, is driven, literally, by these bicycle taxis. The Toleka (or the
Tolekistes), as they are known, are, hands down, some of the hardest-working
people in town. Yesterday, they were the rank and file of various armed
groups. Today, they are the engine that runs the city.
The greater Equateur province1 gave us President Mobutu, Jean-Pierre
Bemba and many of the country’s political elite during the Mobutu years.
During the second Congo war (1998–2003), the province was divided between
the Mouvement pour la Libe´ration du Congo (MLC) rebel group in the
north and Kabila’s government forces, which occupied Mbandaka, in the
south. What the city lacks in roads and other public-transport infrastructure
it makes up for in numbers of ex-combatants. Estimated in the thousands, ex-
combatants in Mbandaka are drawn from the former and current national
armies: Mobutu’s Forces Arme´es Zaı¨roises (FAZ), Laurent Desire Kabila’s
Forces Arme´es du Congo (FAC), Joseph Kabila’s Forces arme´es de la
Re´publique de´mocratique du Congo (FARDC), Jean-Pierre Bemba’s former
MLC rebel group and various other smaller militia groups from the first and
second Congo wars. While many were raised or mobilized in Equateur, many
were not. The one thing that unites many of them is a collective rejection of
an ex-combatant identity, a return to civilian life in Mbandaka and member-
ship now in another group—a bicycle transportation syndicate called the
Toleka Bicycle Taxi Union. Toleka is both a noun and a verb. It means
‘Let’s Go!’ in Lingala, though sometimes it is translated as ‘Let us pass!’.
It is also a noun, as it refers to a group collectively identified as ‘the’ Toleka,
or a Tolekiste.
While ex-combatants in the DRC continue to be marginalized or re-re-
cruited into militia groups, one group that has avoided the temptation to
remobilize thus far is the Toleka—a several-thousand-strong group of ex-
combatants who returned (or remained) in Mbandaka. The Toleka formed
a bicycle-taxi organization and unionized its membership, providing protec-
tions and collective-bargaining authority to the group, while at the same time
providing a public good. However, after nearly 13 years of civilian life, and
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growing hardship and financial difficulty, the nostalgia for their combatant
past is returning.
This article looks at how this organization was formed, how these ex-com-
batants identified and capitalized on a local need and the conditions that
allowed them to successfully unionize and protect their rights as they re-
entered civilian life. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, it seeks
to understand a case of ‘successful’ return in a region with few such successes.
We use the term return instead of reintegration or reinsertion—terms more
commonly used in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
literature—to emphasize the dynamic process in which individual fighters
experience the transition to civilian life. But also to recognize that ex-com-
batants become ‘returnees’ with new experiences and identities. Our research
thus challenges the commonly held perception in much of the DDR literature
that return is focused on the geographic location where individuals are mobi-
lized. Return is often understood by practitioners and scholars alike as home-
coming or repatriation—a return to the homeland—although, as is the case
with the Tolekistes, displaced populations and former fighters often resettle
elsewhere (Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018).
We make three arguments. First, ex-combatants ‘return’ to where they have
support systems. These support systems may be a spouse and children, or
fellow fighters. Ex-combatants do not necessarily return to where they grew
up, or were recruited from or to their province or town of origin. Second, it is
these social support structures and the solidarity provided by fellow ex-fight-
ers through, in this case, the bicycle-taxi union, that provide the best chance
of social integration after war. Conventional approaches to the DDR pro-
gramming of providing vocational training and material kits to ex-combat-
ants are insufficient to sustain them in civilian life, and they often fail. Third,
our research shows that a strong, locally owned support and reintegration
network like the Toleka union can only be as successful as the conditions
around it will permit. If the nature of public authority remains fundamentally
the same as it was when they were mobilized, and ex-fighters return to the
same modes of corrupt, exclusionary or predatory governance that created
the conditions that permitted them to pick up arms in the first place, inte-
gration will fail in the long term.
Our understanding of public authority starts from Christian Lund’s (2006)
definition, for whom it is an ‘instance of power which seeks at least a min-
imum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way’. The
growing body of work on public authority focuses on how authority actually
works. Public authority is thus neither necessarily ascribed to the state nor
expected to take a certain form. Rather, it is a particularly advantageous
position of power that imbues different actors with legitimacy and enables
them to govern people, territory and resources (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot
2014; Hoffmann et al. 2016; Schouten 2016). It is also not something that
magically emanates from the state, but rather is produced through the inter-
face between different authorities’ practices of governance and peoples’
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responses to them. ‘Public authority’ thus is an open-ended and context-de-
pendent process in which a multitude of actors alternately compete and co-
operate with each other. In other words, public authority emerges through
concrete political struggles.
We also integrate into our framework of analysis the role of non-state
actors in producing local political orders and carrying out governance func-
tions that are traditionally located with states. In the DRC, public authority
is constantly contested and negotiated by multiple actors across various
scales. These actors can be from local state government, customary autho-
rities, civil society, religious institutions or the private sector. The nature of
the competition over public authority shapes how governance is delivered and
experienced, and thus conditions the success of security interventions like
DDR.
Return thus matters as much in terms of what former fighters return to as
it does where they return to geographically. So, while ‘DDR programs aim to
change the way ex-combatants and civilians view governance processes’
(Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010: 16), they also need to transform gov-
ernance, not just how it is viewed. This is not to privilege a structuralist
approach to integration. But return and its sustainability have focused largely
on individual agency. It has focused on structures of authority only in so far
as what material incentives these structures can offer to facilitate the process
of return.
Taxi Unions and the Associational Life of Former Fighters
The practice of ex-combatant communities organizing taxi unions in African
contexts is not unique. In Sierra Leone, Peters (2007: 20) argues that motor-
bike ex-combatant associations laid the foundations for a ‘post-war modality
of solidarity based on craft unionism’. Furthermore, it is not just that these
ex-combatants were given jobs and employment, but that there was a sense of
public service and an institutional organization to protect them from abuse.
Solidarity of the armed group was replaced by a solidarity around a common
profession. There was a boom in the taxi business in the post-war period, as
many young people impacted by conflict sought to build new livelihoods in
urban environments. Bu¨u¨rge (2011: 70) in particular has written about the in-
betweenness that the bike-riding business promotes between ex-combatants/
citizens, merging people with different histories and trajectories, ‘thereby
contributing to what is often called reintegration’. Berg (2014) shows how,
in Sierra Leone, this in-betweenness manifests itself in the civilian policing
function of bike-taxi unions in the absence of effective (or due to the preda-
tion of) state security services and thus contributes to local security provision
and to order-making.
Yet, in the same Sierra Leonean context, the bicycle taxi was seen as a
profession of last resort—a survival strategy for ex-combatants who could
not find ‘proper jobs’ elsewhere. Menzel (2011: 99) observed that, in fact, it
4 Tatiana Carayannis and Aaron Pangburn
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cements their lower-class status and leads to a circumstance called ex-comba-
tization in which it ‘socially marks bike riders as former fighters, with all the
negative or even fearful connotations that come with this perception’.
In contrast to West Africa, very little has been written on the development
of taxi associations in Congo, despite their visible presence in urban centres
across the country. An association in Bunia was highlighted in a World Bank
assessment of the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
(TDRP) that the Bank ran from 2009 to 2015. The Association des
Chauffeurs du Congo/ Moto-Ituri was set up at around the same time as
the Tolekistes of Mbandaka and included ex-combatants from all the Ituri
militias, as well as a number of deserters from the FARDC. Instead of bicycles,
they use Chinese motorcycles, due to their low costs and superior load-carrying
capacity (even though they break down frequently). Indeed, this is not a phe-
nomenon limited to Congo. The last two decades have seen an unprecedented
increase in the commercial use of motorcycle taxis across all of sub-Saharan
Africa, particularly in rural areas and smaller urban areas outside capitals
where the availability of public and private transport has been very limited
(Olvera et al. 2016; Lagace 2018). However, unlike the Toleka, the DDR kit
did little for the Ituri association, as only a few motorcycles were provided by a
local non-governmental organization (NGO) (after hearing of the popularity of
moto taxis with ex-combatants), and their distribution simply caused disputes
between those who felt they deserved the new bikes. The report concludes by
highlighting the importance and demand for mechanics in these urban post-
war areas and many ex-combatants wished that this craft and training were on
offer as one of the TDRP’s reintegration support options.
Methodology
This article is based on interviews from fieldwork conducted between 2014
and 2018 in and around Mbandaka, the capital of Equateur province, and a
semi-structured questionnaire deployed in July and August 2018 by the au-
thors and their partners at the University of Kinshasa and University of
Mbandaka. In addition to interviews from earlier field trips that informed
much of the rich description of the daily life of the Toleka, this article draws
its concluding observations from a dataset we developed from the 100 ex-
combatant questionnaire respondents from Mbandaka. The questionnaire
covered 13 different categories and took approximately one hour and 15
minutes to complete with each respondent.
The overarching research questions for the study were as follows, and
developed in consultation with our research partners in DRC and in the
Politics of Return project:
 What is ‘effective’/’successful’ reintegration?
 Lack of remobilisation?
 Security?
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 Livelihoods and employment opportunities?
 Lack of discrimination?
 Conflict resolution mechanisms?
 Are any of these factors replicable?
 What are the effects of location of return on ‘effectiveness’/‘success’ of ex-
combatants’ reintegration?
 Where did ex-combatants ‘return’ (go) following demobilisation)?
 Is there a link between modes of mobilisation/recruitment and loca-
tions of ‘return’?
 What happened to them when they returned (existence and forms of
assistance)?
 What does ‘return’ mean to them?
 Is there a link between ‘return’ and ‘remobilisation’?
Secondary Research Questions
 Is there a link between mental health and ‘effective’/’successful’ reintegra-
tion or remobilisation?
 Is there a link between social capital and ‘effective’/’successful’ reintegra-
tion or remobilisation?
Throughout this study, it is our aim to speak to these questions and see how
these apply to the ex-combatant community in Mbandaka.
The Three Congo Wars
Over the last two decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has
witnessed an extraordinary number of attempts by regional and international
actors to resolve the largest conflict that Africa has seen since independence.
The conflict, however, persists, at an enormous cost. The most that these
attempts have achieved are several partially respected ceasefire agreements.
They have failed to end the violence now focused on eastern DRC or to re-
establish central government authority throughout the country.
The recent conflict in the Congo is best understood as three interlocking
wars (Carayannis 2003). While the Congo wars trace their roots to the
Rwanda genocide of 1994, the first war began in September 1996 as an in-
vasion by a coalition of neighbouring states of what was then Zaire and
resulted in replacing President Mobutu with Laurent Kabila in May 1997.
The second broke out in August 1998 when a similar configuration of neigh-
bouring states, some of which had been Kabila’s patrons in the first war,
broke with him and attempted a similar ouster, but without their earlier
success. It ended with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in
July 1999 by the Kabila government and the two rebel groups fighting it
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(the MLC and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD)),
the result of a stalemate in the war and considerable external pressure.
In both the first and second wars, neighbouring states established local
proxy movements in an attempt to put a local stamp on their activities.
However, the bulk of Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo (AFDL; Alliance des forces de´mocratiques pour la
libe´ration du Congo-Zaı¨re) fighting forces in the first war were foreign
(mostly Rwandan), while, in the second war, this was less so. During the
second war, the MLC rebel group fighting Kabila consisted largely of
Congolese trained by Ugandan officers, while the Rwandan-backed rebel
group, the RCD, was largely integrated with Rwandan troops and com-
manders. When the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed, three rival
Congolese rebel groups—the MLC and the RCD (at the time split between
two factions, RCD-Goma and RCD-K/ML)—controlled two-thirds of the
DRC’s territory.2 Laurent Kabila’s government in Kinshasa, which had
itself taken power by force two years earlier, controlled the remaining
third, including Mbandaka and the southern half of le grand Equateur.
Since the signing of the Lusaka agreement, there was relatively little violence
or combat along the ceasefire lines between Kinshasa-controlled and rebel-
controlled regions.
In June 2003, following a national dialogue and a series of regional agree-
ments, the DRC swore in a Government of National Unity consisting of
leaders representing almost every local actor in the wars. This transition
culminated in a United Nations-supported national election in 2006 that
narrowly elected Joseph Kabila president after two hotly contested rounds
of voting (Carayannis 2008; Weiss 2016). The withdrawal of most foreign
troops during the 2003–06 transition following agreements brokered in
Pretoria created a power vacuum in rebel-held territories and a third ‘war’
began behind United Nations-monitored ceasefire lines in the eastern DRC.
This war was fought between ever smaller groups—foreign and domestic—
that have since become significant actors in the violence and illicit economic
activities in that region.
DDR, Reintegration and Return in the Congo
Since the end of the 2006 post-war transition, the DRC and international
actors have struggled to design, finance and implement a host of national and
regional DDR programmes. The weak capacity of implementing institutions,
widespread corruption, funding gaps, Western-driven and overly technical
processes and a misdiagnosis of local needs have all been raised as core
reasons behind these failures. But, while technical aspects of ‘disarmament’
and ‘demobilization’ have been analysed at length in the DRC and elsewhere
(Molloy 2017), there is a surprising paucity of academic literature about the
risks faced, and threats posed, by returning combatants. Little is known
about how processes of ex-combatant return shape and reshape public
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authority, public life and collective consciousness in Congo, where former
combatants return to, how they negotiate and experience ‘return’, and how
viable ways of life are successfully constituted post return.
Congo’s first national DDR plan was launched in the district of Ituri in
September 2004 (Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo 2004),
due to the urgent need to deal with a wave of voluntary demobilization. It
lasted until 2007. The disarmament and community reinsertion programme
was designed for all militias that had not been signatories to the Sun City
Agreement of April 2002. In the same year, the national DDR programme,
the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (CONADER), became functional. The World Bank (2013b)
oversaw multi-donor support for this process, managing the Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Program with a budget of just over $200
million. This was part of the process of security sector reform, at the heart of
which was the formation of a new national army and police made up of the
belligerents who had signed the Sun City Agreement in 2002.
All combatants from armed groups and the national army were channelled
through orientation centres where CONADER, along with international mili-
tary partners, oversaw the demobilization process (Government of DRC
2004: para. 92). Some of the key groups included the ex-Forces Arme´es
Zaı¨roises (Ex-FAZ) and ex-Forces Arme´es Congolaises (Ex-FAC) from the
national army and rebel combatants from the MLC and RCD rebel move-
ment. This first programme relied heavily on commanders of armed groups to
identify each combatant authorized to enter the orientation centres (ibid.:
para. 65). For those who chose to go back to their communities, the reinser-
tion process was broken down into two phases. First, CONADER provided
ex-combatants with assistance to cover transport costs and subsistence during
a transitional period (ibid.: para. 98). Upon departing from the orientation
centres, ex-combatants received $300, a bicycle and then $50 a month for a
period of a year (World Bank 2013b). In order to address delays and allega-
tions of corruption, CONADER provided biometric ID cards and introduced
the use of cell phones to make payments to ex-combatants. During the fol-
lowing socio-economic phase, CONADER’s official role was to offer infor-
mation and follow-up to the demobilized combatants, while national and
international NGOs were made responsible for supporting the reintegration
of both children and combatants. Four special protects focused on child
soldiers resulted in the removal of 30,000 children from armed groups
(Kolln 2011: 11).
The DDR programme experienced numerous shortcomings and flaws,
many having to do directly with the commission itself. CONADER was
plagued by problems of capacity, communication and financial management
(Kolln 2011: 12). The programme focused largely in reinsertion rather than
reintegration3 and ignored the social and security conditions of the DRC
(Conoir 2012; Vogel and Musamba 2016). Several analysts (US
Department of State 2007; Kolln 2011), backed up by an official World
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Bank (2005) investigation, reported widespread corruption and inefficiency,
forcing CONADER to shut down a year before its four-year mandate was
over. In part, these failings stemmed from the political nature of the com-
mission: recruitment for senior CONADER positions adhered to quotas for
former belligerents provided through the terms of the peace deal, who had
little interest or will to conduct a transparent process and were more inter-
ested in positioning themselves for the 2006 elections (Kolln 2011: 13). The
World Bank, however, also bears responsibility for the failings, as it failed to
set up adequate financial oversight. A US State Department cable (2007)
describes the consequences of these flaws, three years after the programme
began:
Due to management failures, however, many ex-combatants have yet to receive
the promised benefits. Many of the ‘kits’ were never purchased and never de-
livered to claimants. Social reinsertion efforts and livelihood training have been
minimal, and have reportedly only reached a fraction of ex-combatants.
Logistical problems further marred the work of CONADER. Support that
did reach ex-combatants often did not take into account the realities in
reintegration areas, such as the local climate or the economic opportunities.
The commission had little presence outside of the provincial capitals and
was unable to truly follow up and monitor the reintegration of ex-combat-
ants. Before mobile-phone transfers were implemented, ex-combatants had
to travel great distances to receive their monthly reintegration financial
support. In 2007, the World Bank claimed that two-thirds of all ex-com-
batants achieved basic self-subsistence upon returning to their communities.
However, the survey employed to reach this conclusion was later criticized
by statistical evaluators, who claimed the study was extremely limited
(Kolln 2011: 10). Independent evaluations, such as Peace Direct, concluded
that only 58 per cent of ex-combatants actually received any reintegration
support at all (Kolln 2011: 4). The failures of such DDR programmes are
not limited to Congo and the reasons for their failure have been widely
documented in a number of contexts (Muggah and Krause 2009; Bowd
and O¨zerdem 2013; McMullin 2013; World Bank 2013b; Rhea 2016;
Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018).
Nonetheless, not all of the failings can be blamed on CONADER or the
World Bank. The DDR process was hindered by two major contextual fac-
tors outside of its control. First, reintegration efforts were undermined by the
absence of economic opportunities, especially in rural areas. Combatants
were reinserted into economically stagnant communities, with few prospects
for sustaining themselves and their families (Marriage 2007: 297). Second,
demobilization took place in the context of renewed violent escalation centred
on Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense of the People
(CNDP) insurgency. This meant that ex-combatants were often returning to
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communities where renewed recruitment was taking place, and in which
armed groups placed a premium on the military skills of former soldiers.
By September 2006, CONADER’s poor financial management and corrup-
tion had exhausted nearly its entire budget, even though over 60,000 com-
batants had yet to undergo demobilization. As a result, the commission was
forced to close the orientation centres and establish mobile units to process
the remaining ex-combatants (Boshoff 2007). A 2007 World Bank audit even-
tually led to the closing of CONADER.
Since this period, the DRC has seen two additional national DDR pro-
grammes launched. While there have been some improvements in the
development of reintegration programming and activities better aligned
with ex-combatant and communal needs (including the development of UN
community violence-reduction activities), the DRC government and interna-
tional donors have yet to establish a programme that has succeeded in redu-
cing non-state armed group activity. The most recent plan, finalized in July
2014 (Ministry of National Defense and Former Combatants 2014), looked
much better on paper, but the rollout dashed much of its initial promise. A
major starvation tragedy in Kotakoli camp in Nord Ubangui province was
exposed in October 2014, when over 100 ex-combatants and their dependents
died of disease and malnutrition awaiting the next stage of the programme
(HRW 2014). Additionally, violent incidents and protests over living condi-
tions at reinsertion camps in Kitona and Kamina, the lack of sustainable
reintegration programmes and insufficient funding from reluctant donors
have limited the success of DDR III (OIOS 2018).
The Toleka and the Politics of Return
The Toleka association in Mbandaka was formed soon after the peace ac-
cords of 2002 as ex-combatants participated in DDR programmes or ‘melted
into the population’.4 They began to set up some of the collective structures
that were familiar to them from their time in various different armed groups.
Instead of diving into the chaotic civilian landscape of post-war Congo as
individuals, they decided to follow the famous idiom that there is greater
strength in numbers. With their abundance of bicycles from the
CONADER programme, and given the absence of transportation options
in the community, a bicycle-taxi union filled a major need and provided a
public service. Road conditions to this day are very poor in the city of
Mbandaka (outside the official roads between the airport and the institutions
of provincial power), so the vast majority of the community walks or hitches
a ride with the Tolekistes.
They selected a leadership committee and set up an official association and
a governance structure to manage the association’s growing membership. The
secretariat of the Toleka includes a president and vice president, and other
ex-combatants were appointed to handle the finances and membership rolls.
Presidents serve for five years, though elections can be called before then if
10 Tatiana Carayannis and Aaron Pangburn
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the membership is unhappy with the leadership. Everyone in the association
can vote in union elections. Ex-combatants can join as taxi drivers or mech-
anics to assist with the bike repair, as bikes often have flat tires or twisted
frames from the rough terrain. Drivers are required to take a week’s’ training
on the rules of the road. According to Ileli Iponde, the president of the
association, the number of Toleka members in 2014 stood at 7,877 in
Mbandaka alone.5 Mbandaka has an estimated population of 1 million
people, which means that there is approximately one bicycle taxi for every
100 people in town. The union also fields 200 enforcers, or agents de discipline
(agents of discipline). These are considered the toughest of the former fighters
and are deployed around town to make sure that the Tolekistes follow the
rules of the road and can manage any disputes that may arise—both between
the Tolekistes and the community, but also between the Tolekistes them-
selves. So, in effect, the association polices itself.
A mutually beneficial arrangement was set up between the leadership and
its members. The taxi drivers would contribute a portion of their profits to
the association and the association would provide legitimacy with the com-
munity, a regulated transportation market and protection in cases of dispute.
The association also provides some minor health assistance. The greatest
medical benefit, according to some Tolekistes, is the association’s occasional
distribution of Preparation-H, a valuable anti-haemorrhoid ointment.6 The
union will also take up a collection from among the association to cover the
funeral costs of a taxi driver in the event of a death. Another benefit of
membership is free rides around town.
When they started, the Toleka charged 50 Congolese francs per trip.
Today, trips cost about 500 francs, depending on the distance. There is a
fee of 1,000 francs to become a member, and members are then required to
pay 3,000 francs in monthly union dues. Ten per cent of the dues are set aside
to pay the union leadership (who do not drive taxis) and the rest goes to-
wards covering the costs of members’ benefits. It costs 2,000 francs a day to
rent a bike, though the vast majority own their own bicycles. Taxi drivers
also have to pay 3,000 francs a year in income tax to the mayor’s office and
have to carry a card that shows they have paid up their taxes or get fined (or
harassed) if stopped by the police. The union is highly gendered, with men
making up all of the drivers, though the wives of the Tolekistes run the
union’s infirmary, from which they draw a modest income.
As for legitimacy, the Toleka assign their members numbers and licence
plates to reassure the community that there is some accountability. The lead-
ership also determines a range of prices that the driver can demand in and
around town (thus establishing an expectation for the customer) and comes
to the drivers’ defence in the event of any disputes, injuries and claims for
restitution. In the case of accidents, they will hire a lawyer to represent the
union member. The leadership also intervenes in the lives of their members to
help them adjust to civilian life, breaks up fights between them and mediates
their interactions with local communities. This functions much like prison-to-
Home Is Where the Heart Is 11
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/jrs
/a
d
v
a
n
c
e
-a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/d
o
i/1
0
.1
0
9
3
/jrs
/fe
z
1
0
5
/5
7
6
2
4
6
2
 b
y
 A
n
n
a
 R
e
id
 o
n
 0
4
 M
a
y
 2
0
2
0
work programmes in the United States aimed at reducing recidivism by form-
ing a bridge into civilian life. The union leadership uses its collective strength
to bargain with the local state authorities, present the group’s grievances and
advocate on behalf of individual cases—as with labour unions worldwide.
There was some greater accommodation for the Toleka in the early days,
as the authorities were well aware of the possible threat that a large group of
ex-combatants could present if they felt taken advantage of and abused. Yet,
as the years have passed, this fear of the ex-combatant community waned and
the Toleka have become easy scapegoats for local criminality like the Kuluna
(urban street gangs) and predatory security forces, both of which rob civilians
in the cover of night and then blame the Toleka. The ‘unreformed’ ex-com-
batant is also useful target when crimes are committed by a member of an
important political family.7 The Toleka leadership struggles with these types
of cases, as the power imbalance in the judicial system towards the state is
often too strong to overcome. The Toleka are also used by politicians during
electoral campaigns and by businessmen to advertise products, at a rate of $5
per Tolekiste, with 10 per cent of the total reverting to the association.
During a number of electoral campaigns, even in an opposition stronghold
like Mbandaka, the Tolekistes have exhibited some political agency and flexi-
bility, and astute business acumen. They will gladly take the funds, and wear
and distribute the t-shirts representing one candidate during one week and,
once his/her competitor arrives a few days later, switch t-shirts and spread the
word for candidate #2. These sort of ad-hoc financial schemes speak to their
ingenuity, but also to the economic hardship they face in providing for them-
selves and their families on a daily basis.
Unemployment is rampant across the province (as it is across the country),
with most people working in the informal economy, and insecurity is perva-
sive. Circulation at night is rare, given the absence of electricity in the city
and roving bands of Kuluna and predatory military men. A common refrain
is that the province is rich but badly managed. The province has gone for
long stretches without a functioning provincial government. People have
come to call the corruption of the provincial assembly ‘Operation Retour’
(also common in other provinces in Congo (see Caldero´n and Englebert 2019)
and in the army (see ICG 2006))—Kinshasa sends funds to the provincial
government allegedly for development projects in Equateur, and the provin-
cial authorities send the funds back to Kinshasa to line the pockets of gov-
ernment officials there. Anyone who refuses to send the money risks being
accused by Kinshasa of fraud and corruption.
While not all former fighters participated in the CONADER’s DDR pro-
grammes—in fact, many merely self-demobilized—ex-combatants in this
region of Congo came to be known popularly as the ‘ex-CONADERs’—a
label that carries with it a social stigma that these are hardened, unreformed
members of society that should be feared and kept at arm’s length. As in
Sierra Leone, the bicycle taxi is seen as a profession of last resort, a survival
strategy for ex-combatants, who are largely marginalized. For this reason,
12 Tatiana Carayannis and Aaron Pangburn
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while people in the community know who is an ex-combatant,8 the
Tolekistes—most of whom went through the DDR programmes run by
CONADER—do not publically identify as ‘ex-CONADERs’. It is only
during interviews that they will acknowledge that they are former fighters.
They shun the ex-CONADER label and the stigma that comes with it, and
instead have adopted a separate identity—that of being Tolekistes.
It is now used widely across the region to refer to bicycle taxis and taxi
men (they are exclusively young men), including in Swahili-speaking areas.
The term has even been popularized in Congolese music and has earned itself
a Twitter hashtag. It is an attempt to reshape a collective identity from ex-
combatant or ex-CONADER to Tolekiste and reclaim a place within their
community of return. In some ways, this is similar to the integration of
gang culture into rap and hip-hop (Toop 1991; Mitchell 2001; Durand
2002; Ntarangwi 2009; Charry 2012), as the growing popular use of the
term among young, pro-democracy Congolese activists and artists in recent
years has further ‘normalized’ and legitimized the Tolekistes.
Observations from the 2018 Dataset of Semi-structured Interviews Conducted in
Mbandaka
Most (87 per cent) of the ex-combatant community we interviewed demobi-
lized between 2005 and 2006, during Congo’s first national DDR programme.
Over half (56 per cent) came from government forces (FAZ), while the rest
demobilized from a variety of other groups, including the MLC and AFDL
(Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo—led by Former
Congolese President Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila, May 1997–January 2001). An
overwhelming majority of respondents (95 per cent) and all of the Toleka
subset participated in a DDR programme, though not everyone received a
bicycle in their DDR kit. Of the Toleka subset, about two thirds (66.66 per
cent) received a bicycle, which suggests that participation in the Toleka taxi
union is not contingent on receiving a bicycle from a DDR programme.
Where Do Ex-combatants Return to?
In our investigation, only 37 per cent of respondents returned to the area in
which they were mobilized. In fact, most remained where they demobilized.
The general assumption that combatants would automatically return to where
they lived when they joined the armed group does not hold in this case. The
presence of family was the most important factor cited in determining why
the ex-combatant stayed in Mbandaka. Of those who were mobilized else-
where and thus not from Mbandaka, there was little desire to ‘return home’.
Having a familial connection in Mbandaka, a support network of ex-com-
batant comrades and some revenue-generating opportunities in an urban en-
vironment were the principal motivating factors to remain where they
demobilized. However, when asked about their social network and whom
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the Toleka trust and turn to when making tough decisions, friends and neigh-
bours were the top two responses. Therefore, while family might be the pri-
mary reason for return, it is their broader support network and fellow ex-
combatants that they lean on in life’s most difficult moments.
The average time spent in the armed group or army for the whole dataset
of ex-combatants interviewed for this study was 13 years, 11 years just for the
Toleka subset. Over 30 per cent mobilized more than once. Given the length
of mobilization, it is possible that their community of origin transformed
during their long absence. Or, alternatively, the push factors (lack of eco-
nomic opportunity, local insecurity, etc.) that encouraged their mobilization
have not been resolved (all said that they mobilized ‘voluntarily’). Both scen-
arios point to the need to reconsider the common DDR practice that ex-
combatants should be returned to where they lived before they joined the
army or militia group, and instead suggest that DDR practitioners design
programmes than can be tailored to an individual’s assessment of their avail-
able support system and available economic opportunities.
The Lack of Alignment between DDR Training and Current Work
Although the bicycles provided by CONADER kits did provide a part of the
impetus for the establishment of the Toleka, respondents still expressed a
great deal of dissatisfaction on how the programme was managed, the poor
training they received and issues with the distribution of their ‘reintegration
kit’. Sixty-eight per cent of respondents noted that the DDR training they
received does not correspond with their current work. As the starkest ex-
ample, 22 ex-combatants were trained in livestock farming and yet not a
single respondent uses these skills in their current work.
While the CONADER programme was completed years ago and members
of the ex-combatant community might have moved on to other occupational
opportunities, this finding does speak to the general conclusion that the
training provided to the ex-combatant community corresponds with the
needs of the community. Generic training categories were created and the
ex-combatants interviewed were primarily trained in agriculture, carpentry,
breeding and construction/mechanics. In Mbandaka, the training support
received was deemed insufficient by the former fighters and did not translate
into an asset for their reintegration. The bike, in itself, however, was an
important resource for mobility in Mbandaka, but it took the local ingenuity
of the Toleka leadership to transform it into a cooperative association and a
public service for the city.
Economic Hardship
The existence by young former fighters in much of sub-Saharan Africa is
often marked by marginalization, economic difficulties and precariousness
(Honwana and De Boeck 2005: 7). During the summer of 2018, only 24
per cent of the Toleka respondents felt they had sufficient income to support
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their dependents, as compared to only 18 per cent of the other ex-combatants
interviewed. This small percentage corresponds with the general state of pov-
erty felt throughout Mbandaka and Equateur province. The World Bank’s
latest Country Assistance Strategy (2013a: 215) rated Equateur as one of the
three poorest provinces in the country, with over 85 per cent of the popula-
tion living under the $1.25-a-day poverty line (compared to 71 per cent for
the country). Economic growth has been limited since the end of the first
Congo war, and political bickering rather than improvements in policy have
been the norm in the provincial assembly. In fact, the province has shown to
have one of the more dysfunctional provincial governments in the country,
with frequent shutdowns of the provincial assemblies and reappointments of
governors and provincial leadership.
Of the ex-combatant community interviewed for this study, 70 per cent
now believe that they were better off (in terms of food/clothing/housing
and possessions) during their time with their armed group and 60 per cent
feel that other civilians are performing better than the ex-combatant commu-
nity in Mbandaka. But, while they feel that they are worse off than other
civilians, 40 per cent feel better off and 40 per cent feel the same compared to
other ex-combatants. Without deeper studies on the particular circumstance
of each individual, it is difficult to confirm whether these views are factually
accurate, but this strong perception has begun to raise questions for many in
the ex-combatant community that perhaps they should end their 13- to 14-
year-long experiment with civilian life.
These results are consistent with earlier interviews that we conducted with
mostly former army soldiers in Mbandaka in 2014. These felt abandoned, not
‘valorized’ like army veterans in South Africa and Angola (their examples),
and complained that there is no work to be had. The association of the so-
called ex-CONADERs consists of 25 chapters of 25 members each, or about
1,750 national army veterans in Mbandaka.
Social Networks and Trust
The Toleka have established an impressive system of trust to support their
collective efforts as a transport association. Every single Toleka respondent
expressed ‘a lot’ (91 per cent) or ‘some’ confidence (9 per cent) in their other
union colleagues. This was the only category for which there was such a
uniform show of support, although support for the Catholic Church was
nearly as strong (97 per cent). As Peters (2007: 16) has noted: ‘combat pro-
vided fighters with a dense nexus of new connections, and ideas about social
solidarity, that serve as a counter-balance to the pull of patrimonialism.’ On
the low end of the trust spectrum, the least-trusted actor for the Toleka and
other ex-combatants in the community were the police and national govern-
ment leaders. Given other national surveys9 that indicate a similar mistrust in
the security services and political elite of all stripes, this finding is not all that
surprising.
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A large majority (83 per cent) of all respondents said that they were ac-
cepted by their family after they demobilized. Of the small number (17 per
cent) who indicated that their families did not accept them back, the reasons
were overwhelmingly related to the ex-combatant’s financial capacity. Their
families did not accept them because they were unemployed or because they
could no longer help the family financially. A slightly smaller number of
respondents (74 per cent) felt that they were accepted back by their commu-
nities. One participant said that his community is not aware that he is alive
and he prefers it that way. And another replied that his community accepted
him back but was disappointed. Most also felt accepted by the communities
they chose to ‘return’ to. What is particularly interesting is that most re-
spondents (and all of the Tolekistes) do not participate in activities within
their community. In other words, there is no positive correlation between
participation in community activities and community acceptance. However,
in other cases, such as Colombia, Kaplan and Nussio (2015), argue that
participatory communities are better receptors of ex-combatants and prevent
the need for self-organization in a union such as the Toleka in Mbandaka.
While most said that they had heard about DDR programmes through
their military command and hierarchy and their social network, the vast
majority of respondents (70 per cent) said they were no longer in touch
with active combatants since demobilizing and today receive no support
from any active combatants. For the Tolekiste subset, none of them remains
in contact with active combatants. Of those who elaborated on this, responses
revealed a deep mistrust between active and demobilized combatants. Some
respondents went so far as to call the national army the enemy and com-
plained that soldiers do not like them, accuse them of dereliction of duty,
stigmatize them and treat them like dogs. Instead, respondents rely on close-
knit social connections (friends, family, neighbours and other ex-combatants)
for advice, to socialize and to confide in.
Potential for a Return to Arms/remobilization
When asked whether they would consider joining the army or armed group
again, nearly four out of five of the respondents (79 per cent) indicated yes.
This result indicates the sustained financial hardship of this group without an
end in sight and an extreme frustration with the governing elite. From our
interviews, we gleaned that this possible remobilization is not a failure of the
Toleka association, but simply a recognition that a strong, locally owned
reintegration arrangement like the Toleka can only be as successful as the
conditions around it.
The political context also greatly informs these results. Unlike parts of the
eastern DRC, the greater Equateur region saw fewer armed groups and the
principal rebel movement during the second Congo war, the MLC, became a
major opposition political party, giving its supporters other avenues of griev-
ance articulation. Mbandaka has since been an opposition stronghold to the
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Kabila government even though the city was under Kinshasa’s control during
the second war, and even though much of the military and political leader-
ship in the province has been appointed by former-President Kabila or
pushed through the provincial assembly. The results of our questionnaire
reveal a great deal of political apathy and fear of retribution. When asked
whether they have attended a political rally in the last 12months, a few
responses were telling:
Je suis en cole`re de ce que le gouvernement m’a abandonne´. Pourquoi partir en
re´union politique? [I am angry that the government has abandoned me. Why go
to a political meeting?] (Participant 45).
Non, parce que je n’ai pas quelqu’un pour me de´fendre en cas de proble`me [No,
because I do not have someone to defend me in case of a problem] (Participant
44).
However, a few months later, during the December 2018 electoral process,
they were able to voice their discontent with current leadership. In the leaked
Commission E´lectorale Nationale Inde´pendante (CENI; Independent
National Electoral Commission) presidential results of December 2018 (86
per cent of the total votes cast), only 1.79 per cent of Mbandaka city resi-
dents voted for Kabila’s FCC (Common Front for Congo) candidate,
Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.10 Out of all of the rationales provided for
why an individual considered remobilization, no one spoke of returning to
arms in support for the government and only two respondents spoke of
patriotic motivations. This is in sharp contrast to the reasons the ex-combat-
ant community in Mbandaka gave for their initial mobilization when patri-
otism was the number one answer (at 24 per cent of all respondents). That
said, remobilization requires someone to organize it—a ‘remobilizer’
(Themne´r 2011). The consideration to pick up arms may simply be motivated
by the power it affords for predation and as a means to improve their eco-
nomic situation. In fact, 70 per cent of respondents said they were better off
economically when they were in the military or armed group.
Conclusions
If the Toleka has been a relatively successful case of ex-combatant return, it is
because of the ‘absorptive capacity’ of a community to accept ex-combatants,
and the openings and opportunities they provide the general population (de
Vries and Wiegink 2011). The taxi union has provided this opportunity. This
point is also reinforced by much of the literature on DDR, which under-
stands that improving the ‘social vibrancy’ of communities in post-conflict
societies not only benefits the community itself, but also contributes to ex-
combatant reintegration (Sharif 2018). However, most DDR approaches have
failed to achieve this. The Toleka association is the means through which
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these urban, marginalized young men have constituted new forms of sociality
and reclaimed some popular legitimacy and constructed a new identity.
Ex-combatants in Mbandaka stayed where their families and support sys-
tems, often their demobilized cohort, were. They did not necessarily return to
where they grew up or lived when they joined the military or armed group.
As Peters (2007: 19) found in motorcycle-taxi associations in West Africa:
The solidarity of combatants generated in ‘fighting’ has survived the war but
applied to a different ‘job’, riding a motorbike taxi. The union is a key differ-
ence, however, since this is the means to link (through peaceful conflict man-
agement) with the wider society.
As he notes, this is not unlike what Durkheim et al. (1957) points to as the
important role that medieval European guilds played as a basis for ‘organic
solidarity’ (Peters 2007: 19, footnote 40). These new solidarities create the
idea of home and belonging. It is not surprising, therefore, that the common
DDR practice that ex-combatants should be returned to where they lived
before they joined the army or militia group, and separated from their net-
work of comrades in arms, has failed to reintegrate fighters into civilian life.
DDR programmes need to consider the support systems available to demo-
bilized fighters as well as to available economic opportunities.
Moreover, the limits to the success of the Toleka association, and the grow-
ing attraction of remobilization, are better understood in the poor-governance
context of Mbandaka. Despite the many collective benefits that the association
has provided, ultimately, it cannot overcome a state that is failing in its re-
sponsibility to provide for the community. DDR programming and other
forms of reintegration support must be complemented with broader systemic
improvements in the delivery of public services. This requires an approach that
focuses on strengthening communities and improving governance, not on in-
dividuals and DDR kits. If economic conditions do not improve and ex-com-
batants cannot trust their local public authorities to provide justice or security,
then the design of a DDR programme becomes irrelevant. This association
may have reduced the impact of local-governance failures and perhaps delayed
many individual decisions towards remobilization; but it has its limits.
Thus, while the taxi union thus has a mediating, bridging and solidarity
function, it is not a panacea. As Olvera et al. (2016: 3) have observed from
other contexts: ‘The motorcycle taxi provides unskilled former soldiers with a
source of revenue, without calming the fears of a resurgence of past violence
(Peters 2007; Bu¨u¨rge 2011; Menzel 2011).’ Regardless of where the Tolekistes
lived before they joined the war effort, they all returned to the same preda-
tory and exclusionary public authority and governance systems that they
lived under when they joined the army or armed groups. We should not be
surprised, therefore, that today they express a certain nostalgia for a return to
life in the military.
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